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Individualism and Communitarianism
at Work
Thomas C. Kohler*
Our Reporters have given us four remarkably rich, complex
and thought-provoking contributions. Such wonderful work
resists any attempt at quick summarization, and an effort at
offering a brief commentary on the many and nuanced insights
contained in these papers is likely to produce but a set of
scattered and superficial observations. Fortunately, I largely
have been spared such a bootless enterprise. For although I
appear in the role of the "Commentator," I have been asked
instead to make a short report on the work-life sphere in the
United States. I will proceed'on my assignment in the following
manner. In the first part of my remarks, I briefly will address
a theme common to all four Reports, and to the Colloquium as
a whole-how we can be both one and many. I then will discuss
the U.S. work-life situation directly, and conclude with a short
evaluation of the position in which we find ourselves.
I. ON BEING BoTH ONE AND MANY
To begin with, the composition of this panel seems deeply
symbolic in light of the theme of these meetings. Thus, the U.S.
stands as the apogee of an individualistic order, Japan depicts
the paradigm of a communitarian society, while the other
nations represented appear to fall at various points along the
spectrum. This observation takes us to the heart of the subject
of our Colloquium.
Broadly speaking, our topic deals with the question of how
we can be both one and many-or, to phrase the point just
slightly differently, how each of us can be a distinct and unique
individual, yet remain related to all other distinct and unique
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. (This paper reflects
research on a larger study in which the author is engaged. He gratefully
acknowledges the aid of the Fund for Labor Relations studies and the generous
support of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation in pursuit of this work.)
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individuals. This presents a problem common to every sort of
human community, from the state, to the relationship of
employment, to the family itself. The character of our
associations may differ, but our character as humans is a
constant. Consequently, institutional orders inconsistent with
our human character will not survive.
How we can be both one and many is a comprehensive
question, since engaging it forces us to inquire into the
character and meaning of our personhood. As Professor
Blanc-Jouvan points out, it is also an ancient question, one
that is as old as political and legal philosophy themselves.'
Indeed, the chief reason that the individualist-communitarian
debate presently has such an interminable quality about it
stems from the impoverished set of resources in which it is now
conducted.
Succinctly stated, we have only the language of
individualism in which to pursue our questions and carry on
our discussion. The paucity of meanings that this language
carries with it leaves us with an enormous conceptual
blind-spot: we can only comprehend individuals. We almost
cannot conceive of groups or communities. This fact pushes us
to posit a tremendously restricted set of possibilities. We are
left to regard groups as representing affiliations among
discrete, monadic and otherwise unassociated individuals, or to
reify the group as the single, sole individual. Either way, we
end up by denying something crucial about ourselves. We
implicitly reject our character as social beings, or we submerge
our particular and distinct individuality in the mass.
Considered from the first perspective, human community of
whatever description comes to be understood as artificial and
instrumental alliances that are formed for the limited purpose
of satisfying the self directed wants of their otherwise
unrelated members. These desires commonly are reduced to
two categories: the desire for companionship (to enable
self-fulfillment and self-expression) and the desire for economic
or political power. This view imports with it a sort of
reductionism. It suggests that human community of whatever
sort derives its existence solely from the individuals who form
it. Simply put, this perspective teaches us to view groups as
limited partnerships.2 They come into existence to secure some
1. See Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Individualisme et "communautarisme" en droit
frangais: le cas des relations de travail, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 693.
2. See WILSON C. McVILLIAMs, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 89
INDIVIDUALISM AT WORK
end and fall apart once the goal is achieved, their raison d'etre
having been exhausted. This viewpoint thereby reduces human
solidarity to being a transient and instrumental thing that
lasts only so long as some immediate and self-interested need
remains unmet. In Chesterton's evocative imagery, it implies
that humans in community merely are "physically stuck
together like dates in a grocer's shop," and as easily and
harmlessly peeled apart. Professors Blanc-Jouvan and Teubner
well describe the effect such patterns of thought have on our
habits and on the health of our institutions.4
The lone alternative our language supplies to
understanding association as a coincidental aggregation of
individuals is the characterization of the group as the single
individual. Professor Inoue's paper chillingly describes the sorts
of problems and pathological conditions that stem from this
perspective.5 This understanding of association represents a
peculiar strain of individualism, one which, to adapt slightly an
observation made by Wilson Carey McWilliams, is so rigid,
friable and "sensitive that it cannot tolerate rule by others."'
As a result, this viewpoint insists on uniformity and
conformity. Individuals exist only in and through the group;
they have no separate being outside it. Association represents a
sort of inward turning that rests on identity;' the self and the
group simply mirror and affirm one another.
In the final analysis, this understanding of association
rests on a distortion of human existence that can be termed a
group bias.8 The products of this way of thinking have a
depressing familiarity to those who live in the twilight years of
this century. Its poisonous fruits include cults of the state (the
aftermath of which Professor Wyrzykowski details),9 cults of
(1973).
3. Quoted in MATTHEW L. LAMB, SOLIDARITY WITH VICTIMS ix (1982).
4. See Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 1, passim; Gunther Teubner, The "State" of
Private Networks: The Emerging Legal Regime of Polycorporatism in Germany, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REV. 553 passim.
5. See Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking
Through the Window of Japan, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 517, 520, 532-38.
6. McWILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 40.
7. See id. (discussing identity in customary society and the erotic notion of the
self that grounds the idea of the gemeinsechaft).
8. On the idea of the group bias, see BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A
STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 247-50 (Frederic E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran
eds., Univ. of Toronto 1992) (1958).
9. See Miroslaw Wyrzykowski, Individualism and Communitarianism in a
Contemporary Polish Legal System: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
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the people, and cults of other corporate bodies, however
defined. These latter include morbidities as diverse as religious
triumphalism and the "companyism" that seems part of many
participative management schemes.
That our language of individualism is not the only way to
think and speak about the character of association and
personhood is suggested by Professor Inoue's discussion of
self-abnegation and symbolic death.' ° Thus, for example, the
kenosis or death to the self of the Pauline Gospels is not at all
the same thing as the pathological self-annihilation that Inoue
so tellingly describes." Likewise, the self-denial that classical
political philosophy insists is requisite to an individual's ascent
to knowing and authentic liberty stems from a different
understanding of human character than the one assumed by
our predominant individualistic discourse.
Missing from the way we typically speak are points so well
understood by, among others, Aristotle and Tocqueville. As
they point out, humans are conditioned beings by virtue of the
fact that we live and act only in communities. Indeed, most of
our operating as individuals takes the form of cooperating with
others."2 The communities in which we live and perform our
tasks give us an orientation and an identity. They suggest to us
not only who we are, but what our lives and our work mean.
Consequently, communities have a normative function, and
well-functioning communities represent an irreducible human
good. In this perspective, communities and associations of every
sort exist only for the individual. Yet, the social good is prior
to-stands at a more prominent level than-the individual
good, because without it, the good for discrete, individual
persons could not exist.
The primary function of community is to assist the full
development and proper unfolding of human personality which
in turn finds its complete expression in the activity of authentic
self-rule. Thus, Aristotle, in the Politics, emphasizes the role of
community as the place where the citizen learns "both to be
ruled and to rule."'3  Tocqueville likewise stresses the
REV. 577, 577-80.
10. See Inoue, supra note 5, at 532-38.
11. Id.
12. See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 48 (Univ. of Toronto
1990) (2d ed. 1972) (human intersubjectivity and structure of the human good). On
the spontaneous character of human sociality, see also 1 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK,
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35-54 (Univ. of Chicago 1973).
13. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 92 (Bk. III, ch. 4 (1277b15)) (Carnes Lord trans.,
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importance of associations and mediating groups and their
potential to act as "schools for democracy." 4 As both so clearly
understood, individuals and societies alike become and remain
self-governing only by repeatedly and regularly engaging in
acts of self-government. The habit sustains the condition.
In short, it is in community with others that we literally
learn the political habits necessary to sustain life together.
Hence, it is the small associations and mediating bodies in
which community actually exists that act as "seedbeds" for the
civic virtues. These bodies set the conditions for the sort of civic
friendships that hold a society together and that facilitate the
civil conversations that ground self-rule. As Edmund Burke
observes, 'To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little
platoon we belong to in society is the first principle (the germ
as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series
by which we proceed toward a love of our country and to
mankind." 5 Bluntly put, we cannot learn toleration and
respect for others in a vacuum. Nor can we learn or practice
self-rule in isolation. Humans are not self-sufficient beings. We
only learn who we are, and gain some sense of the fullness of
our human potencies, through acting with others. This fact
leads Aristotle to observe that the person without community
"is either a beast or a god."' 6 The mention of a vacuum and
the want of community turns us to consider the current state of
the work-life sphere in the United States.
II. WORK-LiFE IN THE UNITED STATES
Since at least the time of Tocqueville, foreign scholars have
shown a great interest in various attributes of the American
legal system. One of the things for which the United States has
become best known is its home-grown institution of "free"
collective bargaining. In this regime, the state establishes and
sanctions a voluntary ordering system, but leaves the outcomes
achieved through the process to be determined by the parties
themselves, free of governmental influence. The legal
framework for American-style collective bargaining stands as
1984).
14. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AiERICA 63 (J.P. Meyer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., 1969).
15. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON TE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110 (Thomas
Mahoney ed., 1955).
16. ARISTOTLE, supra note 13, at 37 (Bk. I, ch. 2 (1253a25)).
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an example of what Gunther Tuebner terms a "reflexive" legal
scheme.' The goal of reflexive law, Tuebner suggests, is
"regulated autonomy," or controlled self-regulation.' 8 Reflexive
legal schemes entail minimal state intervention in the ordering
of relationships since they rely on market mechanisms to shape
their results. The fact that the traits of this system may now
be better known outside the United States than within its
borders gives some hint of the state of our domestic situation.
In the United States, the term collective bargaining
irtually is synonymous with the Wagner Act.'9 The core goal
of the statute is to protect and enhance individuals' status
through the defense and maintenance of freely formed and
autonomous employee groups. This feature defines the statute
and characterizes the unique position the Act holds in
American law. It represents the only place in our otherwise
highly individualistically-oriented jurisprudence where the law
has encouraged the formation of mediating bodies through
which to promote individual empowerment and to foster
self-determination. In the final analysis, the Wagner Act rests
on a distinctly different idea of the character of our personhood
than that which typically informs American law.2" The
transformations that have occurred in our culture and mores
since the time of the Acts passage, however, appear to have
left the statute's basic purpose and meanings increasingly
opaque to us.
Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935. In so doing, and
in sharp contrast to the course taken by the rest of the
industrialized world, Congress deliberately opted for a system
that would involve minimal state intervention in the
employment relationship. In the United States context,
collective bargaining can be best and most thoroughly
understood as a private law-making system. Thus, the United
States Supreme Court has described the collective bargaining
agreement as not just a contract, but "a generalized code"2'
17. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
LAw & Socy REv. 239, 254-55 (1983).
18. Id.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1938).
20. See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule:
Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of
DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149.
21. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 580
(1964).
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that represents "an effort to erect a system of industrial
self-government" through which the employment relationship
can be "governed by an agreed-upon rule of law."22
The promulgation and administration of this law largely is
the responsibility of the affected parties alone. Consequently,
American collective bargaining agreements typically erect a
private dispute resolution system-the grievance arbitration
process-that the employer and union jointly administer. These
systems generally have jurisdiction over nearly every sort of
dispute that might arise concerning the employment
relationship. The presence of an arbitration system normally
precludes the courts or other arms of the state from
adjudicating matters that come within the parties' dispute
resolution scheme.
The so-called exclusivity principle bottoms the American
model of collective bargaining. It also marks one of the starkest
differences between the American and Continental
industrial-relations systems. The exclusivity principle rests on
the idea of majority rule. The principle establishes the
association formed by a majority of employees in the affected
workplace unit as the exclusive representative of them all. The
principle prohibits an employer from attempting to bypass the
majority-designated representative by unilaterally changing the
terms or conditions of employment, or by dealing with
individuals or groups of employees independently of the union.
The preferred status the majority-representative enjoys in this
scheme carries with it the legally enforceable obligation to
represent all employees fairly and even-handedly, regardless of
their support for or membership in the union.
The exclusivity doctrine prevents the fragmentation and
dissolution of the strength employees achieve through collective
action. It thereby acts to protect the principles of
majoritarianism that underpin the Act's scheme. The
exclusivity principle reflects the fact that American workers
generally organize and bargain on a workplace or employer
basis, and not at an industry-wide or national level. To a
substantial degree, the principle is a function of the emphasis
in American-style collective bargaining on local, "bottoms-up"
law-making. The centrality of exclusivity to the Act's scheme
reveals the statute's preoccupation with the removal of
22. Id. at 580.
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impediments to the free formation of autonomous,
self-organized employee associations.
In considering the statute, it is important to note that
Congress did not "invent" collective bargaining. Rather,
Congress through the Wagner Act adopted a scheme whose
characteristics and practices jointly had been developed over
time by workers and employers. Congress in passing the Act
intended to institute a comprehensive uniform and flexible
system through which the employment relationship could be
ordered. Hence, rather than attempting to adjust specific
problems legislatively, the Act left it to the parties themselves
to identify and resolve matters of mutual concern. The chief
significance of the American collective bargaining scheme lies
in the opportunity it provides to involve people in making and
administering the law that most directly determines the details
of their daily lives. The process both permits and requires
people to decide for themselves the kind of people they will be,
and to explain and justify those choices to one another.
The Wagner Act was amended in 1947 and again in 1959.
The latter date is significant because it marks the last time the
United States as a nation gave anything like comprehensive
consideration to the question of how to order the employment
relationship. To be certain, many changes have occurred in the
past three decades. The legal responses, however, have been on
a piecemeal basis, and typically without full regard for all their
implications.
The decline in private-sector unionization constitutes one
of the most pronounced changes that has occurred in the
United States work-life sphere during the past thirty years. In
his report, Professor Blanc-Jouvan describes France as having
reached a "critical threshold," with union membership in the
private-sector at 5-6%.2" The U.S. is not far behind. Right
around 1960, approximately 34% of the U.S. private-sector
workforce was organized.' Today, that figure is under 12%25
23. See Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 1, at 720.
24. Leo Troy, Convergence in International Unionism, etc. The Case of Canada
and the U.S.A., 30 BRrr. J. INDus. REL. 1, 39, Table A-2 (1992) (compiling data);
Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at
the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CIII. L. REV. 953, 953 n.1 (1991)
(explaining difficulties in compiling data on union membership rates).
25. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992,
at 422, No. 672 (112th ed. 1992) (union members, by selected characteristics, 1983
and 1991).
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and some expect it to fall to 7% by the end of this decade."
Significantly, the decline of unions began at roughly the
same time that families, neighborhoods, religious
congregations, service and fraternal groups, local political
clubs, and the other institutions that characterized American
democracy began to unravel. This is no mere coincidence. No
single "mediating body," whether in the form of families,
churches, civic, political and service organizations, or unions, is
likely to survive in the absence of the others. All of them
require and can instill the same sorts of habits: decision,
commitment, self-rule and direct responsibility. No single
institution on its own can inculcate or sustain these
characteristics. The existence and decline of all these bodies is
mutually conditioning; the collapse or deformation of any of
them affects the rest.
So, what's become of what Tocqueville called "the nation of
joiners"? Recent survey data indicates that Americans remain
eager participants in the activities of voluntary associations.
Yet, the same data suggests that during the past thirty years,
much of that participation has been limited to clipping a
coupon in a magazine and returning it with a small financial
contribution to an association like the Sierra Club, Common
Cause, or the American Association of Retired Persons (which
is now the largest voluntary association in the U.S.). The
smaller, local bodies that directly mediate the relationship
between individuals and the large institutions of public
life-and which involve people in the often messy business of
actually associating with each other-are faring less well.
The American work-life sphere has not been insulated from
the trends toward fragmentation that have affected the other
institutions of civil life. Commentators as diverse as Emile
Durkheim, John Dewey, Elton Mayo and Frank Tannenbaum
all predicted that the workplace would become a primary
source of common life in modern society. Consequently, they
26. Causes of Loss of Union Membership Debated at New York University
Conference on Labor, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), June 8, 1992, at A-3 (Leo Troy)
(projecting from present trends). Significantly, in their 1985 article, Accounting for
the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-80, 38 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 325 (1985),
William T. Dickens and Jonathan S. Leonard stated that if the number of private
sector nonconstruction union members remained roughly constant, and if
"employment continues to expand at about 2.5% per year, the unionized share of
the workforce will not fall below 15% before 1995.' By 1989, private sector
diversity had reached 12% and has continued to decline.
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urged that special attention be paid to the employment
relationship and to occupational groups that could assist in
grounding individuals in the conditions created by modern
markets and mass democracies. That attention has not been
forthcoming. Instead, along with the decline of unions and
other mediating bodies has come a significant loosening in the
employment bond itself. So-called contingent employment
arrangements (part-time, temporary and contract-based) are on
the rise, and are expected to double over the next few years.
One well-known observer of labor market trends characterized
these arrangements as "just-in-time" employment.27  As
American industry seeks to become more competitive, she
predicted, "all employment relationships are going to become
more fluid."28 It may be that instability increasingly
characterizes many of the significant relationships among
Americans: employment relationships in the U.S. now last an
average of 4.5 years,29 while the average marriage lasts but
seven.3" Trends are not wholly clear, but the average length of
both may be on the way down.
Consistent with these developments is the fact that
increasingly the workplace itself is less one "place." Thus, for
example, ten percent of the Chicago area employees of
American Telephone and Telegraph now work at locations
other than company facilities-many of them at home. Despite
concerns about the impact of employee isolation, such
"telecommuter" arrangements are on the rise.
Our legal culture also has influenced our prevailing views
about the desirability of a system that promotes private
ordering through groups. In short, it has taught us to apply
what Paul Ricoeur calls the "hermeneutic of suspicion"3'
towards groups, and to see in them an ever-present threat to
personal liberties and the unfettered exercise of individual
27. Rising Use of Part-Time and Temporary Workers: Who Benefits and Who
Loses?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988) (statement of
Audrey Freeman, Executive Director, Human Resources Program Group, The
Conference Board).
28. Id. at 36.
29. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, News, June 26, 1992
(USDL 92-386) (includes tables compiling data).
30. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992,
at 92, No. 132 (112th ed. 1992) (median duration of marriage, 1970-88).
31. PAUL RIcoEuR, HERMENEuTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCEs 34, 63-64 (John
B. Thompson ed. & trans., 1981).
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choice. Thus, it is not without significance that since the
mid-1960s, the First Amendment freedom to associate has
received its greatest development at the hands of the United
States Supreme Court as the freedom not to associate. In
similar fashion, the judicially-created union duty of fair
representation has been developed during the past twenty-five
years in a way that has deeply intruded the courts into the
internal affairs of unions.32 The courts thus have breached the
public-private distinction which they so scrupulously observed
in the early cases that first announced this duty nearly fifty
years ago.33 To the extent they have done so, the courts have
made unions public institutions. Indeed, it was fear that
government intervention would eventually result in the
regulation of unions that led the noted scholar and social
commentator, Mary van leek, to oppose passage of the
Wagner Act.$'
So, what has replaced collective bargaining? Like nature,
law abhors a vacuum. Thus, the piecemeal and ad hoc
regulation of the employment relationship markedly has
increased as the practice of collective bargaining has declined.
Common law courts have entered the area by developing
various contract, tort and public policy-based restrictions of an
employer's ability to discharge or discipline employees.
Congress and state legislatures also have become very active in
enacting a wide variety of legislation addressed to specific
workplace problems. This thrust away from private ordering
has left parties with a contracting boundary within which to
regulate the terms of their relationship through collective
bargaining. Moreover, some of this legislation, like the
landmark Americans with Disabilities Act,35 conflicts at
several places with the law under the National Labor Relations
Act.36 In short, Congress itself seems to have forgotten about
collective bargaining and to have abandoned it as a means for
adjusting work-life issues.
Collective bargaining provides a powerful means for
32. For one spectacular example, see Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619
F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
33. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
34. See IRVING BERSTEIN, THE NEw DEAL CoLLE=rIvE BARGAINING POuCY 67
(1950).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. 1992).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). The National Labor Relations Act is the
Wagner Act as amended.
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employees to participate in workplace decisions. As
unionization has declined, management has responded with
participation schemes of its own. In contrast to the collective
bargaining model, however, which is founded on the formation
of autonomous employee groups and assumes that workers and
management have mutual as well as divergent interests, the
managerially sponsored schemes have little room for unions
and are based on convincing employees to see corporate goals
as being identical with their own. There is nothing new about
such schemes. Their use long-predated passage of the Wagner
Act, and they represent a competing scheme of participation to
that sanctioned by the statute.3 7 While the legality of such
unilaterally implemented schemes under the Act is highly
questionable, their use appears widespread.
Considering the United States situation in light of
Continental developments raises the question of whether
something like a transference-instead of convergence-of
orders is at least potentially underway. The employment
relationship in the U.S. is ever-increasingly being subjected to
direct and pervasive state regulation. In the meantime, the
stated desire of the Social Charter seems to be to nudge the
European Community states in the opposite direction.38 Thus,
consistent with the subsidiarity principle that suffuses its
terms, the Social Charter expressly endorses collective
bargaining as a means to implement the Charter's goals.39 It
also provides that collective bargaining agreements can act as a
source of Community law. Likewise, France's continuing efforts
under its "Auroux" laws to institute greater private ordering
through a "social dialogue" stands in sharp contrast to the
trends seen in the United. States.
Prospects for any sort of comprehensive legal reform aimed
at. revivifying and restoring the practice of private ordering
through collective bargaining appear very poor indeed. Unions
have slight political influence-as the 1992 presidential
campaign demonstrated. "Jobs" was the mantra of both the
37. For a description of participation schemes and their premises, see Thomas
C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section
8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 500-34 (1986).
38. The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers,
COM(89)471 final.
39. On this point, see Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons From the Social Charter:
State, Corporation and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.
(forthcoming Summer 1993).
INDIVIDUALISM AT WORK
parties. Yet, not one authentic representative of working men
and women was invited to speak at either the Democratic or
the Republican conventions. To both parties, unions have
become "special interest groups," and the once-celebrated
practice of industrial self-government has come to be regarded
as a danger to "competitiveness."
An undertaking as controversial and as sweeping in impact
as comprehensive labor law reform requires real political
discipline to achieve. Such discipline is a function of methodical
organization and a structure that can hold potential wanderers
to positions settled on by the parties. Such structure and
ability to impose discipline presently are lacking among
Republicans and Democrats alike. Hence, although they parade
under the banner of one or the other of the parties, those in the
legislative branch more and more act as independent
contractors. Indeed, the parties themselves currently exist
chiefly as fund-raising organizations which ask little more of
their "members" than regular financial contributions. The
parties' once vibrant connections to the grass-roots, which
existed in the form of precinct, ward and county organizations
and neighborhood political clubs, now largely have disappeared.
Their demise has been helped along, incidentally, by various
United States Supreme Court opinions that, in the name of the
First Amendment freedom of association, dissolved the
institutions supporting local political activity.40
In short, we will have and presently are undertaking labor
law reform. But, it is coming about through a series of
unconnected half-steps that amount to a de facto repeal of the
National Labor Relations Act rather than through any fully
considered and comprehensive course of action. The ultimate
results likely will be a much different workplace and social
order than any we envisioned-or intended.
III. EVALUATION: DEPENDENCY AND THE
QUESTION OF PERSONHOOD
It is appropriate here to make a quick evaluation of our
common situation. We began with the image of a spectrum and
the suggestion that the nations represented on this panel
covered the range of the individualist-communitarian legal and
40. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Elrod v. Bums,
427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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social models. But, it may turn out that no spectrum exists.
Instead, as we consider each Report, we find the same result,
with our Reporters describing what are actually variations on a
theme.
To summarize briefly: In the United States, we have what
might be called a condition of "formal individualism." There are
relatively few self-organized mediating structures in the work-
life sphere, and those that exist represent a dwindling
membership. Ever less constrained by collectively set
determinations, Americans are free to bargain and select the
terms and conditions of their employment individually. In
reality, this means that individuals have become increasingly
dependent on their employers and the state to regulate the
order of the employment relationship. Few actually participate
directly in making and administering the law that governs
their lives in the workplace.
This state of dependency appears ubiquitous. Thus, in
France we find plenty of mediating structures-but no
members. In Germany, we discover the emergence of what
Professor Tuebner calls "polycorporatist" structures that
mediate horizontally among specialized sectors of society which
are rooted in different horizons of meanings.41 In Germany, as
in France and the United States, the continuing fragmentation
of common understandings, and the relentless spread of
instrumental reason, has left these structures with highly
attenuated links to their "base." Lastly, we find in Japan a
situation in which individuals are highly dependent on
corporate structures. In short, across the board, we see the
same thing: dependent individuals possessed of little ability to
determine the day-to-day conditions of their lives. Wherever we
look, we find individuals not as self-determining agents, but as
objects of administration.
All of this returns us to the fundamental theme of our
Colloquium and invites us to consider the extent to which our
present approaches successfully have resolved the question of
how we can be both many and one. The results of our
comparative inquiry also press us to ask whether modern
liberalism, with its limited conception of community, ends up
by undermining the social conditions necessary to sustain its
noble project of enhancing individual status and personal
41. See Teubner, supra note 4.
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liberty. Raising this question prompts us to consider again
what a human is. It may well be that the notions of personhood
that typically inform our thoughts are deeply inadequate, and
that we are far more than we think ourselves to be. To put the
point briefly: Was Tocqueville correct in insisting that in the
modern era, self interest "provides the only stable point in the
human heart,"4 2 and hence, the sole basis for grounding a
democracy?
This point raises the most fundamental of questions and
requires us to ask whether we are sovereign beings invested
with rights or conditional beings, situated by mutual
obligations. These matters turn us to inquire about what
humans properly can claim to know, and whether there are
limits to intelligibility. As the French Reporter points out, we
cannot long stay on this terrain without confronting the
philosophers and the moralists.4 But, neither can we avoid
these questions if we are to take our own work and its
implications seriously. There is a natural desire to pursue such
issues, which can be suppressed only by deforming ourselves
and distorting the order that we bequeath to subsequent
generations.
42. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14, at 239.
43. Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 1, at 694.
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